Paper #29. Disinformation Trackers & Destroyers

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia, Strategy
  • No Comments

This sortie is a follow-on to ICSL Paper #28 which showed how critical thinking errors lead to exploitation. Our focus here is on freely available platforms and programs that can track and destroy disinformation.

Paper #28. To Defeat Disinformation, First Arm the Mind

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Asia-Pacific, Cyber, Eurasia, Middle East & North Africa, Strategy
  • No Comments

Disinformation is a global threat. Pervasive digitized technology and social media provide rich opportunities to distort public perceptions at scale. Authoritarians assail democracies incessantly.

Paper # 27. Aggregates, Supply Chains & Influence Maneuvers: Synthesis for Competition and Warfare

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • All Analysis and Planning, Asia-Pacific, Commercial, Cyber, Middle East & North Africa, Strategy
  • No Comments

Synthesis combines otherwise separate reactants into a new whole, releasing energy. In our highly interactive information environment, this process ranges from rules-based competition to totalitarian warfare.

Paper #26. Supply Chain Competition & Warfare II: Strategic Decisions and Integrative Options

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Asia-Pacific, Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia, Strategy
  • No Comments

Authoritarian states are weaponizing supply chains into all-effects warfare while democratic states compete with inferior strategies. We can be more competitive and wage superior complex warfare in kind.

Paper #25. Supply Chain Competition & Warfare I: Fundamentals of Advantage

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Asia-Pacific, Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia, Strategy
  • No Comments

Supply chains are vital to socio-economic well-being and military success. They have become arenas where authoritarians wage complex warfare while democracies compete with inferior strategies.

Paper #24. Distorting the Loop: How Russia’s Narratives Reorient OODA Decisions & What to Do About It

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Cyber, Eurasia, Strategy
  • No Comments

As a follow-on to China’s strategy, we show how Russia’s use of narrative reorients decisions in an Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop. The distortion of information is not just divisive. It envelops the “when-deterrence-fails” US approach to warfare.

Paper #23. Collapsing the Loop: How China’s Narrative Subverts OODA Decision-making & What to Do About It

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Asia-Pacific, Cyber, Strategy
  • No Comments

Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop—Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act— is a powerful model for making decisions in contested environments. Strategic use of information can defeat it. Understanding narrative strategies can protect it.

Note #15. Tracking Chinese and Russian DisInformation: Hamilton 2.0 Reloaded

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Asia-Pacific, Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia
  • No Comments

This Note paraphrases today’s webinar from the Alliance for Security Democracy on Hamilton 2.0, a dashboard on Russian, and now Chinese, disinformation.

Paper #21. Informatizing Operations: The Other Half of All-Domain Warfare

  • Michael D. Phillips, Col USAF ret. & Thomas A. Drohan, Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Cyber, Leadership, Strategy
  • No Comments

Warfare has become all-domain, all-effects, and all-information. This reality is thriving in a comfort zone outside our entrenched concept of a “threshold of armed conflict.”

Paper #15. Countering Cyber Attacks on Infrastructure

  • Will Miller, Major, US Army
  • Americas, Asia-Pacific, Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia, Leadership, Middle East & North Africa, Strategy
  • No Comments

State-sponsored cyber attacks against critical infrastructure are increasingly pervasive. Their global presence and effective methods are asymmetric, coercive, and debilitating. 

Paper #10. Countering Russian Cyber and InfoWar

  • Will Miller, Major, US Army
  • Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia, Strategy
  • No Comments

We must also seek solutions that limit the effects of disinformation. This effort starts with leaders recognizing and publishing Russian exploits as they are discovered. Overt exposure of Russian methodology goes a long way in limiting the effectiveness of false narratives. Investigations should identify who is targeted in hacks, why they were chosen as targets, what information has been stolen, and the extent of related penetration.

Paper # 9. The Primacy of Information Intelligence: Operational-to-Strategic Advantage

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Cyber, Strategy
  • No Comments

The question of what and whom to trust applies to all situations because uncertainty is pervasive. In the information environment (IE), the overriding context of trust is that it’s contested. Actors fight for the kind of information and people they need to compete and prevail. Four types of competition become apparent when we consider four contested purposes of strategic and anticipatory analysis: