Note #15. Tracking Chinese and Russian DisInformation: Hamilton 2.0 Reloaded

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Asia-Pacific, Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia
  • No Comments

This Note paraphrases today’s webinar from the Alliance for Security Democracy on Hamilton 2.0, a dashboard on Russian, and now Chinese, disinformation.

Stick & Rudder #3. An All-Effects Strategy Against COVID-19.

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D, Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Security, Strategy
  • No Comments

COVID-19 is an advanced threat against humanity, requiring a broad-based combination of effects to defeat.

Note #14. Machine-learning a Video: “The Corona Virus and the Impact on the Global Supply Chain”

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Leadership, Strategy
  • No Comments

This Note analyzes complex linkages in a YouTube video from the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics: The Corona Virus and the Impact on the Global Supply Chain.

Paper #20. Competing with Analog Weapons in a Digital Arena? How to Gain Advantage.

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Leadership, Strategy
  • No Comments

Let’s explore how to gain advantages by comparing analog and digital characteristics of the Information Environment (IE).

Paper #15. Countering Cyber Attacks on Infrastructure.

  • Will Miller, Major, US Army
  • Americas, Asia-Pacific, Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia, Leadership, Middle East & North Africa, Strategy
  • No Comments

State-sponsored cyber attacks against critical infrastructure are increasingly pervasive. Their global presence and effective methods are asymmetric, coercive, and debilitating. 

Paper #12. Time to Recreate Effective Competitive Advantage: Strategy, Technology and Information.

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Leadership, Strategy
  • No Comments

In 1983, Project Socrates began as a Reagan initiative to develop technology-driven competitive advantage. Then it ended.

Paper #10. Countering Russian Cyber and InfoWar.

  • Will Miller, Major, US Army
  • Commercial, Cyber, Eurasia, Strategy
  • No Comments

We must also seek solutions that limit the effects of disinformation. This effort starts with leaders recognizing and publishing Russian exploits as they are discovered. Overt exposure of Russian methodology goes a long way in limiting the effectiveness of false narratives. Investigations should identify who is targeted in hacks, why they were chosen as targets, what information has been stolen, and the extent of related penetration.

Paper # 9. The Primacy of Information Intelligence: Operational-to-Strategic Advantage.

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Cyber, Strategy
  • No Comments

The question of what and whom to trust applies to all situations because uncertainty is pervasive. In the information environment (IE), the overriding context of trust is that it’s contested. Actors fight for the kind of information and people they need to compete and prevail. Four types of competition become apparent when we consider four contested purposes of strategic and anticipatory analysis:

Paper #8. How to Integrate National Defense & Security Strategies: A Detailed Analysis.

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Americas, Commercial, Leadership, Security, Strategy
  • No Comments

As a detailed follow-on to The US National Security Strategy Needs Combined Effects, this paper integrates combined effects with the US National Defense Strategy (NDS), too.

Note #5. Mastering Diverse Spectra of Competition.

  • Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D., Brig Gen USAF ret.
  • Commercial, Security, Strategy
  • No Comments

Previous notes introduced combined effects strategy for complex warfare. We can understand this form of warfare as a competition that blends cooperation and confrontation.